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Markets and Sovereignty*
JOSEPH BLOCHER & MITU GULATI†
The past few decades have witnessed the growth of an exciting debate in the legal 
academy about the tensions between economic pressures to commodify and philosophical 
commitments to the market inalienability of certain items. Sex, organs, babies, and college 
athletics are among the many topics that have received attention. The debates often have 
proceeded, however, as if they involve markets on one side and the state on the other, with 
the relevant question being the ways in which the latter can or should try to facilitate, restrict, 
or rely on the former. In this article, we approach the relationship between markets and 
sovereign control from a different perspective, and contemplate more radical versions of 
their relationship. What would it mean for governing authority itself to be market alienable? 
And what would it mean if the people—rather than the state—were the ones who set the 
prices and controlled the transfers? Could a ‘market for sovereign control’ contribute to 
welfare-enhancing changes in governance?
Au cours des dernières décennies, les théoriciens du droit se sont engagés dans un débat 
passionnant au sujet des tiraillements qui existent entre les pressions économiques en 
faveur de la marchandisation et les engagements philosophiques à l’égard de l’inaliénabilité 
marchande de certains produits. Le sexe, les organes, les bébés et le sport collégial 
figurent parmi les nombreux sujets qui ont retenu l’attention. Toutefois, les débats opposent 
fréquemment les marchés, d’une part, et l’État, d’autre part, et s’articulent autour de la 
question de savoir comment l’État peut ou devrait tenter de faciliter, de restreindre ou 
d’exploiter les marchés. Dans cet article, nous abordons le lien entre les marchés et le 
contrôle souverain sous un angle différent, et nous envisageons des versions plus radicales 
de ce lien. Quelles seraient les conséquences si la fonction gouvernementale elle-même 
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était aliénable sur le marché? Et si c’étaient les citoyens, et non l’État, qui fixaient les prix 
et contrôlaient les transferts? Un « marché du contrôle souverain » pourrait-il contribuer à 
modifier la gouvernance en vue d’améliorer le bien-être?
THIRTY YEARS AGO, MARGARET RADIN’S ARTICLE “Market-Inalienability”1 
helped shape the controversies that are the focus of this special issue: the proper 
limits on what can be sold, how, and why. The special issue articles—including 
Radin’s own—reflect the importance of those debates and the transformations 
they have undergone. Some characteristics of the debates have remained 
consistent, however. For the most part, the debates about market inalienability 
and commodification2 have proceeded as if they involve markets on one side and 
the state on the other, with the relevant questions being how and why the latter 
can facilitate, restrict, or rely on the former.3
We approach the relationship between markets and sovereign control from 
a different perspective and contemplate more radical versions of it. What would 
it mean for governing authority itself to be market alienable? And what would 
it mean if the people—rather than the state—were the ones who set the prices 
and controlled the transfers? Could a ‘market for sovereign control’ contribute to 
welfare-enhancing changes in governance?
1. Margaret Jane Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100 Harv L Rev 1849.
2. Market inalienability refers to the proposition that a given item may not be traded in a 
market, while commodification refers to the transformation of an item into a commodity 
that is traded in markets.
3. See e.g. Kimberly D Krawiec, “Foreword: Show Me the Money: Making Markets in 
Forbidden Exchange” (2009) 72:3 Law & Contemp Probs i; Alvin E Roth, “Repugnance as 
a Constraint on Markets” (2007) 21:3 J Econ Persp 37 at 39-40; Philip E Tetlock, “Thinking 
the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions” (2003) 7:7 Trends Cognitive Sci 320.
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Similar questions have arisen in a variety of contexts, perhaps most obviously 
in the debates over privatization of functions formerly performed by the state.4 
In Radin’s terminology, critics of privatization tend to argue that certain state 
functions should be market inalienable (and perhaps inalienable altogether) 
because to sell them (or transfer them at all) would threaten a variety of important 
values, from participatory democracy to civic identity to the prevention of 
corruption.5 But by and large the privatization debate implicitly accepts the 
markets-versus-sovereign control paradigm.
We instead investigate the possibility of a market for sovereign control. 
In doing so, our goal is to improve the allocation and exercise of the power to 
govern, not to vindicate markets as such. The focus of this article is therefore 
on those situations in which sovereign control—the power to govern—is being 
used in a harmful way, and where the introduction of a market-type solution 
might help remedy this harm. The three scenarios we have in mind are those 
4. See Martha Minow, “Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion” 
(2003) 116:5 Harv L Rev 1229 at 1230 (stating that “a useful definition [of privatization] 
encompasses the range of efforts by governments to move public functions into private 
hands and to use market style competition”). For commentary, see generally Martha Minow, 
Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public Good (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002); Special 
Issue, Symposium: Public Values in an Era of Privatization (2003) 116:5 Harv L Rev; Special 
Issue, Symposium: New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors (2002) 
49:6 UCLA L Rev; Special Issue, Tenth Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges 
- Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization (2001) 
28:5 Fordham Urb LJ.
5. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983) at 100 (noting the various types of “blocked exchanges”—items, services, and 
entitlements that cannot be bought or sold); Michael J Sandel, “What Money Can’t Buy: 
The Moral Limits of Markets” (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered at Brasenose 
College, University of Oxford, 11-12 May 1998) (criticizing the use of market conceptions 
to understand areas traditionally immune from such thinking).
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL468
involving oppressive governments,6 refugees,7 and regions (or member states of 
an international organization) that are inflicting serious harm on their nations (or 
international organizations).8
These three issues are complicated enough standing alone, and each raises 
unique challenges. But they also share a common feature, which is that states’ 
invocations of sovereignty—especially control of sovereign territory—are treated 
as trump cards that stand in the way of efforts to address underlying tragedies.9 
For the purposes of our analysis, we instead treat sovereign control as a legal 
entitlement predicated on good governance—an entitlement that can therefore 
be involuntarily alienated on those grounds. Moreover, we try to construct a 
framework wherein the power of alienating sovereignty is not held exclusively by 
those who govern countries, but is shared with the people in whose name that 
sovereignty is exercised.10
This reconceptualization of sovereignty, rather than the invocation of a 
market mechanism, is—legally speaking—the most novel and radical part of our 
proposal, and the part with which international lawyers are most likely to disagree. 
6. See Part I, below. See also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, “A Market for Sovereign Control” 
(2017) 66:4 Duke LJ 797 [Blocher & Gulati, “A Market for Sovereign Control”]; Karen 
Knop, “A Market for Sovereignty? The Roles of Other States in Self Determination” 
(2017) 54:2 Osgoode Hall LJ [insert pg number once we know]; W Mark C Weidemaier, 
“A (Very Thin) Market for Sovereign Control” (2017) 66 Duke LJ [forthcoming]; 
Anna Gelpern, “Cinderella Sovereignty” (2017) Duke LJ, online: <http://dlj.law.duke.
edu/2017/01/a-very-thin-market-for-sovereign-control/>.
7. See Part II, below; Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, “Competing for Refugees: 
A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis” (2016) 48:1 Colum HRLR 53 [Blocher 
& Gulati, “Competing for Refugees”]. See also E Tendayi Achiume, “The Fact of Xenophobia 
and the Fiction of State Sovereignty: A Reply to Blocher and Gulati” Colum HRLR Online 
[forthcoming in 2017]; Peter Schuck, “Comment on Blocher and Gulati, ‘Competing for 
Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis,’” Colum HRLR Online (24 
January 2017), online: <www.hrlr.law.columbia.edu/category/hrlr-online/>.
8. See Part III, below. See also Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, “Forced Secessions” (2017) 
80 Law & Contemp Probs, Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 215 (2017); Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence R Helfer, 
“Can Greece be Expelled from the Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule on Expulsion from 
International Organizations” in Franklin Allen et al, eds, Filling the Gaps in Governance: The 
Case of Europe (Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, 2016) 127.
9. Human rights scholars have been fighting this battle for decades; their success is debatable. 
See generally Eric A Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).
10. On the argument that a modern understanding of sovereignty should be located in the 
right of people to what one might call collective self-determination, see Margaret Moore, 
A Political Theory of Territory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 9, 50.
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We believe, however, that this reconceptualization represents not only the best 
reading of underlying principles of international law, including such apparent 
irreconcilables as territorial integrity and remedial secession, but also a desirable 
response to some of the most serious threats to human rights and welfare.
One common legal response to those threats has been a full-frontal assault on 
the fortress of sovereignty. This assault has generally failed. Despite a few breaks,11 
the walls have held. Others have attempted a flanking maneuver by suggesting 
that state sovereignty is no longer as certain as it once was,12 or that corporations 
and NGOs are the new sovereigns.13 But this response is not satisfying either. 
Despite the undoubted rise of other forms of pseudo-sovereign power, national 
borders continue to shape destinies.
Our solution is not to dissolve or diminish sovereignty, but to reclaim 
it. We think of the people as the legal ‘owners’ of sovereignty,14 and we believe 
that states’ exercise of sovereign control is ultimately defeasible—it can be lost 
or forfeited under certain circumstances.15 Moreover, we do not think of the 
current map of sovereign control as representing any immutable facts about 
the world. Rather, sovereign control (largely captured by national borders) can 
and sometimes should change in response to popular will. Our two moves, 
therefore, are to conceptualize sovereignty as resting with the people, and as being 
transferrable by them on a variety of terms. Our goal is not just to think critically 
about markets, but about sovereignty itself.
We approach these questions as legal scholars and our primary tools are 
law, economics, and history. But those are not the only lenses through which to 
view the issue of territorial sovereignty. Most notably, a small group of political 
theorists, including David Miller, Cara Nine, and Anna Stilz, have been asking 
11. See e.g. W Mark C Weidemaier, “Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt” (2014) U Ill L 
Rev 67 at 69 (noting the modern default rule on foreign sovereign immunity, which is that 
countries engaging in cross border commercial transactions are deemed to have waived their 
rights against being sued in foreign courts).
12. See e.g. Neil MacCormick, Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
13. See e.g. Abdul A Said & Luiz R Simmons, eds, The New Sovereigns: Multinational 
Corporations as World Powers (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975).
14. In the United States, the reconception of sovereignty in these terms is foundational to the 
constitutional system.
15. We support the right of self-determination in some circumstances, for example, and we 
argue that nations can essentially be forced to sell regions to which they have denied 
representation or equal rights. See Blocher & Gulati, “A Market for Sovereign Control,” supra 
note 6 at 819-22.
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basic questions about sovereignty and territory for some time.16 International law 
and theory have yet to catch up, but perhaps, just as Radin’s pioneering work 
drew on various non-legal philosophical traditions, we can help bring political 
theory and international law closer together.
I. BAD BORDERS AND OPPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS17
Although well-drawn national borders are important—perhaps essential—to 
good governance and economic development,18 they were not all drawn with 
those goals in mind. Many national borders reflect nothing more than the 
whims of colonial administrators, the results of military conquest, or something 
as random as the King of X bequeathing a dowry for his daughter’s marriage 
to the King of Y.19 Though the passage of time may have transformed some of 
these idiosyncracies into something like national identity,20 other undesirable 
boundaries have been unimproved or even worsened by the passage of time. The 
dominant religion in a region might change, or the region might find natural 
resources that exacerbate underlying tensions. Whatever the cause, the result 
is that some regions are in the ‘wrong’ countries—wrong in the sense that the 
16. See e.g. David Miller, “Property and Territory: Locke, Kant, and Steiner” (2011) 19:1 J 
Pol Phil 90 (describing the individualist Lockean theory of sovereign territory associated 
with Hillel Steiner and others); Cara Nine, “A Lockean Theory of Territory” (2008) 56 Pol 
Studs 148 at 155 (defending a “collectivist Lockean theory” under which “the state acquires 
territorial rights in much the same way that individuals acquire property rights”); Anna Stilz, 
“Nations, States, and Territory” (2011) 121:3 Ethics 572 at 578 (arguing that states “have 
territorial rights because their jurisdiction serves the interests of their subjects”).
17. The analysis in this Part expands that of our work, “A Market for Sovereign Control,” and 
some of the summary passages are directly reproduced. See Blocher & Gulati, “A Market for 
Sovereign Control,” supra note 6.
18. See generally Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 2003) (treating national borders as a determinant of development, rather than an 
exogenous variable).
19. See Anthony Farrington, “Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia” (2002) 52 
Hist Today 40 at 40 (noting that Portugal gave Bombay to England as part of the dowry of 
Catherine of Braganza, who married Charles II).
20. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977) at 164, cited in Tayyab Mahmud, “Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial 
Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier” (2010) 36:1 Brook J Int’l L 1 at 48 (“Every established order 
tends to produce … the naturalization of its own arbitrariness”).
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region’s inhabitants would be better off if their region were governed by another 
country’s government.21
The cost of this state of affairs is difficult to overstate. Many regions, 
especially those whose populations are national minorities, justly feel oppressed 
and ill-served by their current countries. Some regions try to secede and form 
their own nations. But such attempts tend to be fiercely resisted even in the most 
civilized countries. Other regions yearn not to govern themselves but to be part of 
a wholly different country. This desire is often viewed with even more disfavour. 
International law and practice give national boundaries a strong presumption of 
stability, and the mechanisms for changing them are often ill-suited to the task. 
As a result, undesirable borders—and therefore sovereign control—typically stay 
in place until they are forcibly moved by secession or the intervention of some 
powerful external actor. Violence, instability, and poverty are frequent byproducts.
In some cases, these conditions slip into outright oppression as nations 
deny their own people the political representation and equal rights that are the 
preconditions of legitimate sovereign control.22 In those scenarios, the traditional 
conception of sovereignty acts as a shield for brutality. Without doing away with 
sovereignty, how might those problems be avoided?
21. They might also be much better off if their existing country had a different government, 
of course, and the basic mechanisms of democratic change might in some circumstances 
allow them to choose them. When available, those mechanisms are often a better means 
to the welfare-enhancing ends we advocate. But for legal, political, or other reasons, that 
will not always be a feasible option, particularly for unpopular or oppressed minorities. 
In effect, we think that said inhabitants should be able to vote for existing governments in 
other countries. Readers who are uncomfortable with the market rhetoric here can hopefully 
embrace this as a radical version of popular sovereignty, with an alternative framing: 
“Democracy Without Borders” or “Borders in a World of Popular Sovereignty.”
22. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 128-35, 161 DLR (4th) 
385 [Secession Reference]. See also Loizidou v Turkey, No 15318/89, [1996] VI, where Judge 
Wildhaber concurring, joined by Judge Ryssdal states: “In recent years a consensus has 
seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right to self-determination if their human 
rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if they are without representation at all or are 
massively under-represented in an undemocratic and discriminatory way. If this description 
is correct, then the right to self-determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish 
international standards of human rights and democracy” (ibid at 458) [Loizidou]; Cf Milena 
Sterio, “On the Right to External Self-Determination: ‘Selfistans,’ Secession, and the Great 
Powers’ Rule” (2010) 19 Minn J Int’l L 137 at 137-39 (discussing criteria used by the 
international community to validate a group’s self-determination efforts).
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A. SOVEREIGNTY AS PROPERTY
One solution is to conceptualize these problems as a question of allocating a 
valued resource: sovereign control over territory.23 Although the nature of the 
resource is unique (and that uniqueness complicates the analysis), the problem 
of allocating valuable resources is hardly novel. Indeed, the dominant legal 
solution in liberal democratic societies is deeply ingrained and well-worn: 
assign clear property rights, protect them, and let parties bargain their way to 
mutual advantage.24 Creating a market for sovereign control, then, would mean 
assigning property rights in sovereign control and permitting them to be traded. 
In a well-functioning market, sovereign control and territory would largely be 
matched up based on supply and demand.
The initial and crucial question is who gets to hold the key property 
right—who, in other words, gets to determine the national identity of a region. 
We suggest that the right (and therefore the power to alienate) should be held 
jointly by the region’s inhabitants and the state itself, with the relative strength of 
their entitlements depending on the degree to which the state is well-governed. 
Where states engage in the kind of oppressive conduct mentioned in Part I, 
above, they lose their right to forbid exit, and the region may transfer sovereign 
control over itself to another state.
Although they are neither described nor practiced in quite this way, current 
principles of international law could be seen to support this kind of joint control. 
Indeed, our goal is to derive solutions from within international law, not, for 
example, from first principles of normative political theory. Many sources 
of international law, including the UN Charter,25 say that all peoples have a 
right to self-determination, which means a power—within limits—to choose 
23. An alternative would be to alleviate the scarcity by creating more of the resource. This 
is essentially what is accomplished by “sea-steading.” Such efforts not only generate new 
sovereign places, but essentially create new sovereigns—sometimes in a corporate form. 
Accordingly, they raise a set of complications that is related but not identical to those 
discussed here. See “Seasteading: Cities on the Ocean,” The Economist (3 December 2011), 
online: <www.economist.com/node/21540395/>.
24. We are not the first to suggest the utility of analogies to private law. With special reference to 
international arbitration, see generally Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies 
of Law (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1927). See also Lauterpacht stating, “The part 
of international law upon which private law has engrafted itself most deeply is that relating 
to acquisition of sovereignty over land … .” (ibid at 91). See also Paul B Stephan, “Blocher, 
Gulati, and Coase: Making or Buying Sovereignty?” (2017) 66 Duke LJ [forthcoming].
25. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7.
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who shall exercise sovereign control over them.26 The viability of the right of 
self-determination is of course debatable.27 But if it is to be taken seriously, then 
peoples who occupy a particular region—call it Kashmir, Jaffna, or Scotland—
should be able to decide to put their national identity up for auction. Other 
states that want to take on the region could then bid in this auction, offering 
some combination of (a) citizenship or other valuable resources to the populace, 
and (b) compensation to the rump state—for example, by taking on a portion of 
its national debt.
One important complication here lies in defining—and justifying—
what counts as a region for purposes of our proposal. This is not a problem 
unique to our proposal: The current right of self-determination as articulated 
in international conventions generally accrues to “peoples,”28 and no one quite 
knows what those are either.29 But we think that sub-national application of 
the principle of uti possidetis30 can provide useful guidance in this regard. The 
boundaries of Scotland, Kashmir, and Catalonia are reasonably clear, at least 
26. See e.g. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 3 art 1 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR]; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 art 1 (entered into force 
23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR]; Principles which should guide 
Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called 
for under Article 73 e of the Charter, GA Res 1541(XV), UNGAOR, 15th Sess, UN Doc 
A/4651 (1960) 29 at 29 (explaining that self-determination could lead to secession and the 
formation of a new state, association of a territory with an existing state, or integration of a 
territory into an already existing state). See also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] 
ICJ Rep 116 at 122 (Separate opinion of Dillard J, stating “It is for the people to determine 
the destiny of the territory … .”); W Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in 
International Law (New York: Nellen, 1977) at 147 (stating “[t]oday, there is no doubt that 
self-determination, as defined in U.N. and general international practice, is a principle of 
international law which yields a right to self-government that can be claimed legitimately by 
bona fide dependent peoples”).
27. See e.g. Allen Buchanan, “Theories of Secession” (1997) 26:1 Phil & Pub Aff 31 at 33; Hurst 
Hannum, “Rethinking Self-Determination” (1993) 34:1 Va J Int’l L 1 at 42.
28. See General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and People, GA Res 1514, UNAGOR, 15th Sess, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/L.323 and 
Add.1-6 (1960).
29. See Secession Reference, supra note 22 at para 123 (“the precise meaning of the term ‘people’ 
remains somewhat uncertain”); Marcelo G Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 1, 6-9.
30. The doctrine of uti possedetis freezes existing boundaries, including those of newly 
independent states that were previously governed as colonies. See Stuart Elden, “Contingent 
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders” (2006) 26:1 SAIS Rev Int’l 
Aff 11at 11-12 (describing uti possedetis and identifying “territorial preservation of existing 
boundaries” as a central tenet of the international political system).
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on the map. One might also start by identifying the peoples who are being 
systematically disfavoured by a nation. In a sense, by choosing to disfavour a 
particular region—a group of people who occupy a certain territory—a state 
would thereby establish both the conditions and the scope of the exit right.
Importantly, in most cases, the state in which a region is currently located 
also has a legitimate property-type right in maintaining its current borders. This 
principle, too, is reflected in existing international law—most prominently in the 
principle of territorial integrity, which unsurprisingly often conflicts with that of 
self-determination.31 Accordingly, in the case of a well-governed state, the offering 
state’s bid would have to be accepted both by the people of the departing region 
and by the population of the remaining portion of the state. In functional terms, 
we propose viewing international law as assuming an implicit bargain among the 
regions of a state and the central government to assist each other in thriving; they 
are assumed to have entered into a compact to benefit each other.32 Compacts, 
however, can be breached by misbehaviour by one or more sides—so much so 
that exit is part of the remedy. And, in some cases, it may serve everyone’s interest 
(in the sense of Pareto superiority) to allow the dissolution of the compact.
Of course, in most countries—especially functioning democracies—
would-be governments already compete with each other in the form of political 
parties vying to win periodic elections. That internal competition is a basic 
characteristic of democracy. But such competition occurs within the contours of 
each country’s institutions, politics, and economics. There are some situations in 
which a particular region, because of factors such as religion, ethnicity, or wealth, 
either has no effective voice in this process or is not able to thrive regardless 
of which local political party prevails. Under the current system, the people of 
that region might try to emigrate to other states that are willing to have them 
and where they can thrive better. Immigration, though, tends to be difficult for 
the poor, weak, and infirm, and often breaks up families and communities. But 
what if the people of these regions had the option of having their new state come 
to them as opposed to them going to it? A market for sovereign control—for 
moving borders to fit people, rather than people to fit borders—would make 
31. See Michael P Scharf, “Earned Sovereignty: Juridicial Underpinnings” (2003) 31:3 Denver 
J Int’l L & Pol’y 373 at 373 (stating that “the defining issue in international law for the 
21st century is finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and the 
sanctity of borders”).
32. Our notion of this implicit bargain among regions to help each other thrive parallels, 
in certain ways, the implicit relationships among regions in a nation (e.g., Catalonia in Spain) 
described by the political theorist David Miller in his work on conceptualizing territorial 
rights. See David Miller, “Debatable Lands” (2014) 6:1 Int’l Theory 104 at 106-108.
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this possible, thereby furthering basic democratic ideals while rewarding and 
incentivizing good governance.
As we have explained elsewhere,33 the foregoing is largely but not entirely 
consistent with existing principles of international law. What we have described 
is essentially a mechanism of peaceful cession (a well-recognized principle in 
international law) with the addition of a requirement—approval of the transferred 
region—that we think better reflects current principles of international law.34 
We also incorporate, as described in more detail in Parts I(C), III, below, some 
version of remedial secession in scenarios involving oppressive governance.
B. THE CORPORATE ANALOGY
The idea of a market for sovereign control shares features with the market 
for corporate control,35 but has some crucial differences. The similarities are 
straightforward. In corporate law, one of the factors that disciplines managers 
is the power of shareholders to get rid of them. This can occur in one of two 
ways: either the shareholders (citizens, in our scheme) can vote the management 
(domestic government) out of office, or they can sell their control rights to a 
different set of shareholders. The first of these options is akin to democratic 
accountability through the domestic political system. It is the second element—
what Albert Hirschman called an exit right36—that we seek to strengthen.
33. See Blocher & Gulati, “A Market for Sovereign Control,” supra note 6.
34. In keeping with our general notion of sovereignty belonging to the people, we equate the 
approval of the country with approval by its citizens.
35. For classic works on the topic see Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R Fischel, “The Proper 
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer” (1981) 94:6 Harv L Rev 
1161; Henry G Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73:2 J 
Political Economy 110. See generally Steven M Davidoff, “Takeover Theory and the Law and 
Economics Movement” in Claire A Hill & Brett H McDonnell, eds, Research Handbook on 
the Economics of Corporate Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2012) 216.
36. See Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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TABLE 1: THE MARKETS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL AND SOVEREIGN CONTROL
Market for Corporate Control Market for Sovereign Control
Owners Citizens
Managers Governments
Shares Citizenship
Corporate control (the power to manage) Sovereign control (the power to govern)
Firing management Domestic political accountability
Selling shares and corporate control Changing citizenship and sovereign control
Table 1 compares the main features of markets for corporate and sovereign 
control. In our market for sovereign control, people ‘own’ the region in which 
they live. They decide who governs their region, not just in terms of domestic 
political parties, but also in terms of the state itself. Governments are therefore 
treated as managers rather than owners, as they would have been under 
traditional conceptions of international law. So long as they satisfy the wishes of 
their citizen-owners, they can remain in control. But if the citizenship ‘shares’ of 
the citizen-owners of the region are underperforming as a result of mistreatment, 
they can ask for bids from other states. If a particular border configuration is not 
working, just as if a particular firm size or structure turns out to be suboptimal, the 
people harmed by the existing borders should have some option to change them 
without international law saying borders can never (or should never) change.
The market for sovereign control would push this analogy further, for the 
transaction we envision would be more akin to a merger or tender offer than 
a sale of individual stock. Thus, both the shareholders/citizens and current 
manager/government would have to approve the sale. In this sense, the ownership 
right is partially held by the citizens of the rest of the state, since governments 
will seek to keep them happy as well. Refusal by the manager/government to 
accept an attractive offer is likely to produce political backlash. So long as the 
political channels within the parent state are functioning,37 we can expect the 
interests of citizens and governments to overlap to a large degree, just as corporate 
management will typically approve a transaction if there is overwhelming 
shareholder support for it.
37. We recognize that this will not always be true, and—incorporating the logic of remedial 
secession—we would permit regions to exit even without the state’s approval where those 
channels are closed.
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A key difference between the system we propose and the typical US corporate 
context is that, as described in more detail below, the rights of the citizens to boot 
out the current management would be limited to conditions where the local 
population is being systematically disadvantaged—either oppressed (in which 
case exit is free), or denied equal rights and representation (in which case exit is 
allowed only upon payment of compensation).
In theory, this right could be expanded beyond what international law 
currently recognizes to say that the region’s right to demand an auction gets 
triggered whenever the region is able to demonstrate that the parent state is 
breaching its fiduciary duty to allow the population of the region to thrive. Further, 
to the extent other states are allowed to put in bids for this underperforming 
region (something international law would currently frown on as interference 
with territorial sovereignty), the size of those bids might be one factor that a court 
could consider in evaluating whether the region should be allowed to put itself 
on the market. Currently, though, international law does not recognize a robust 
fiduciary duty of sovereigns to the people, nor does it allow for sovereigns to bid 
for regions in other states.
Further, there is no market on which sovereign ownership interests are 
traded and thus can be evaluated by outsiders. A concededly imperfect proxy 
exists, however, in the markets for public debt. Sovereign debt is akin to stock in a 
corporation in that it—especially if denominated in local currency and governed 
by local law—can be thought of as a residual claim on assets of the sovereign.38 
This is because this kind of debt only gets paid at the option of the sovereign; 
practically, that means only if the sovereign has the expectation of large future 
surpluses. If a country is being mismanaged, its likelihood of default will be higher 
and its debt will trade at a discount. The higher the degree of mismanagement, 
the bigger the discount is likely to be. An outside state that thinks it can improve 
the management of the nation or a portion thereof can purchase the discounted 
debt and then, if it is able to obtain control, reap a substantial return. This is 
particularly so since the outside state, as part of the purchase price for control, 
will likely have to take over some portion of the prior state’s debts.39
38. See Ashoka Mody, “Sovereign Debt and its Restructuring Framework in the Euro Area” 
(2013) Bruegel Working Paper, online: <www.bruegel.org/2013/08/sovereign-debt-and-its-
restructuring-framework-in-the-euro-area/>; Christopher A Sims, “Fiscal Consequences for 
Mexico of Adopting the Dollar” (2001) 33:2 J Money, Credit & Banking 597.
39. Our analogy works best if the region itself issues publicly traded debt, like Catalonia, 
Quebec, and Puerto Rico do.
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Alternatively, a region that is seeking independence could pursue private 
investors via bond issuances. Purchasers of these bonds might be those who are 
betting on the ability of the region to produce high returns once it separates itself 
from its old master, but they could also be members of the region’s diaspora who 
have other reasons to support exit.40
Of course, countries are not corporations, and we do not seek to equate them. 
We note, however, that corporate law generally gives shareholders greater rights 
vis-à-vis their boards than international law gives citizens vis-à-vis their countries. 
For example, in US corporate law, the primary legal mechanism used to protect 
shareholders from boards’ resistance to exit is a robust notion of fiduciary duties 
that requires the boards not only to allow, but to facilitate exit under certain 
conditions in which a new management can add significant value. As noted, this 
idea of fiduciary duties is but a nascent norm in the international law context.41
C. BAD ACTORS
The market we have described in Part I(B), above, is best suited for situations in 
which both the parent state and the region are well governed, and negotiations 
about transfers can proceed peacefully. But what about those all-too-common 
scenarios in which the region wants to leave not just because it sees the possibility 
for marginal improvement in its standard of living, but because it is being 
seriously oppressed?
This is a central challenge for international law. Indeed, it has been said 
that “the defining issue in international law for the 21st century is finding 
compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of 
40. On diaspora bonds generally, see Anupam Chander, “Diaspora Bonds” (2001) 76 NYU 
L Rev 1005. Among the historical examples are the US issuance of bonds to fund the 
Louisiana Purchase and the issuance of bonds to the Irish diaspora to fund the independence 
movement. See Robert D Bush, The Louisiana Purchase: A Global Context (New York: 
Routledge, 2014); Francis M Carroll, Money for Ireland, Finance, Diplomacy, Politics, and the 
First Dáil Éireann Loans, 1919-1936 (London: Praeger, 2002).
41. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Draft Principles on Promoting 
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing (Geneva: 26 April 2011) (incorporating the idea 
that governments have some fiduciary type obligations to their citizens vis-à-vis management 
of their debt stocks). Also see Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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borders.”42 Although it is perhaps too soon to declare it a rule of international 
law, the principle of self-determination has been recognized in foundational legal 
documents43 and is thought by many to include a right of remedial secession in 
cases of severe oppression.44 Along the same lines, recent years have seen growing 
support for the notion that the world community has a “responsibility to protect” 
when human rights are threatened.45
These principles suggest that in cases of extreme oppression, a region should 
be able to secede freely, in order to save itself.46 In market terms, this essentially 
means transferring sovereign control from the parent state to the region itself, 
at no cost. But what about parent states that are not engaged in the kind of 
genocide and extraordinary oppression that would give rise to a right of remedial 
secession, but are nonetheless underserving their regions in some significant way? 
Here, we depart from much of the literature on exits from states, in that we do 
not only consider the possibility of exit under conditions of extreme oppression.47 
Instead, we suggest that where a parent state has failed to provide representation 
42. Scharf, supra note 31 at 373. See also Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in 
International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Antonio Cassese, 
Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) at 190; Lea Brilmayer, “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial 
Interpretation” (1991) 16:1 Yale J Int’l L 177.
43. See supra note 26 and the sources cited therein.
44. See Lee C Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self Determination (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978) at 220-223; T M Franck, “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right 
to Secession” in Catherine Brölmann, Rene Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck, eds, Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 3.
45. See e.g. 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, UNGAOR, 6th Sess, Supp No 49, 
UN Doc A/60/1 (2005); Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility To 
Protect, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess, Supp No 1, UN Doc A/63/677 (2009); Cf Buchheit, ibid; 
Saira Mohamed, “Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect” (2012) 48 Stan J Int’l L 319 
(expressing disappointment in the implementation of this responsibility); Steven R Ratner, 
“Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law Beyond the Tribunal Chamber” 
(2006) 100:4 AJIL 808 at 811.
46. For examples of other scholars who have seen a robust right to secede as a way of protecting 
minority groups who are being severely oppressed and for an overview of the literature on the 
subject, see Allen Buchanan & David Golove, “The Philosophy of International Law” in Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Donald L Horowitz, “The Cracked Foundations of 
the Right to Secede” (2003) 14:2 J Democracy 5 (arguing, among other things, that giving 
an oppressed peoples the right to exit a bad situation makes them less likely to try and work 
things out with their oppressors).
47. See e.g. Horowitz, ibid.
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or equal treatment to a region,48 the state loses the right to forbid secession but 
remains entitled to compensation set by the market, subject to review by a third 
party such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).49 In market terms, this 
means that the parent state’s sovereign control would be protected by a liability 
rule rather than a property rule.50
Combining these scenarios with the one described, in Part I(A), above yields 
the three-part framework set out in Table 2.
TABLE 2: ELEMENTS OF THE MARKET FOR SOVEREIGN CONTROL
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Who ‘Owns’ 
Sovereignty Parent state Region Parent state
Who Must Approve 
Transfer
Parent state and 
Region Region Region
Who Sets Price Parent state and Region Region
1. Auction; 2 ICJ (if 
price disputed)
48. We derive this standard from the UN Declaration, which suggests that territorial sovereignty 
is predicated on representativeness and equal treatment. See Declaration on the Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625, UNGAOR, 25th Sess, Supp No 
18, UN Doc A/2625 (1970). The Declaration reads, “States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described 
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour” (ibid). See also Secession 
Reference, supra note 22 at paras 128-135. The court states, “[T]he international law right to 
self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations 
of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign military 
occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their 
political, economic, social and cultural development” (ibid at para 138) [emphasis added]. See 
also Loizidou, supra note 22. Judge Wildhaber concurring, joined by Judge Ryssdal states, 
“In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right to 
self-determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if they 
are without representation at all or are massively under-represented in an undemocratic and 
discriminatory way” (ibid at 458).
49. We use the ICJ as a possible institution. It would of course have to expand its mandate and 
expertise considerably to be able to tackle such matters. We are, however, more than open to 
suggestions as to alternate institutions that could perform the same function.
50. See generally Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85:6 Harv L Rev 1089. Although they are 
not exactly voluntary from the perspective of the parent nations, we consider these liability 
rule transactions part of the broader market for sovereign control.
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Corresponding Legal 
Principle Territorial Sovereignty
Self-Determination 
(or Remedial 
Secession)
Combination 
of Territorial 
Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination
State of Governance Good (Strong Default Rule)
Oppressive or 
Genocidal
Denies Representation 
or Equal Rights
Note: Italicized portions represent changes to the current system.
II. REFUGEES
The market for sovereign control described above in Part I would—we hope—
help facilitate welfare-enhancing changes in sovereign control, and would reduce 
the incentives for states to persecute their own people. But it is not a perfect 
solution even to the problems it purports to address, and there are many other 
problems that fall entirely outside of its scope. Most notably, because the market 
we have described is focused on sovereign control over territory (albeit in a unique 
way), it does not speak directly to the tens of millions of people without sovereign 
territory—specifically, those displaced by persecution.
A. THE CRISIS
Consider the tragedy of the Rohingya. Facing long-standing and horrific 
persecution in Myanmar, where most of the Rohingya live, thousands have taken 
to the sea, hoping to find safety in Thailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia.51 But those 
countries resist paying what they see as the costs of Myanmar’s oppression.52 The 
result is that potential host states such as Malaysia adopt policies like interdiction, 
prevention of access, and other roadblocks that prevent refugees from arriving 
on their shores.
51. See “The Rohingyas: The Most Persecuted People on Earth?” The Economist (13 June 2015), 
online: <www.economist.com/news/asia/21654124-myanmars-muslim-minority-have-been-
attacked-impunity-stripped-vote-and-driven>; Katrin Kuntz, “Burma’s Stateless Muslims: 
The World’s Most Persecuted Minority,” Spiegel Online (3 June 2015), online: <www.
spiegel.de/international/world/an-account-of-the-flight-of-the-rohingya-minority-from-
burma-a-1036589.html>.
52. See e.g. Bill Powell, “No Rest for the Rohingya of Myanmar,” Newsweek (25 May 2015), 
online: <www.newsweek.com/no-rest-rohingya-refugees-myanmar-335187>; Beh Lih 
Yi, “Malaysia Tells Thousands of Rohingya Refugees to ‘Go Back to Your Country’” 
The Guardian (13 May 2015), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/13/
malaysia-tells-thousands-of-rohingya-refugees-to-go-back-to-your-country>.
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The Rohingya’s calamity is not unique.53 The number of displaced people (a 
category that includes but is not limited to refugees) hit a record high in 2017.54 
Those people are fleeing conflicts, poverty, famine, and persecution in Asia, Africa, 
the Middle East, and elsewhere. Hundreds of thousands, particularly from Syria, 
are currently finding their way to Europe, a fact that has, at least for the moment, 
increased the amount of attention given to the issue in the West. Western states 
are being directly confronted with the costs, political and otherwise, that have 
long been disproportionately borne in the Southern hemisphere. Unfortunately 
for the refugees, the focus in Europe seems to have turned from assisting the 
refugees to figuring out ways to deter them from seeking refuge there.55
Nearly seventy years ago, another flow of refugees in Europe—those displaced 
by World War II—gave rise to the UN Convention that remains the basis of 
international refugee law.56 The Convention is in some ways a success. It provides 
some clear rules and protections, especially that of non-refoulement,57 and has 
53. See Somini Sengupta, “60 Million People Fleeing Chaotic Lands, U.N. Says,” (18 June 
2015) New York Times, online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/world/60-million-people-
fleeing-chaotic-lands-un-says.html>.
54. See Krishnadev Calamur, “A Refugee Record: The UN says 65.3 million people were 
displaced last year by conflict and persecution, a new high,” (20 June 2016) Atlantic, online: 
<www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/un-refugees/487775/>.
55. See e.g. “Migration Spat Mars Leaders’ Bid to Revive EU,” (16 September 2016) Financial 
Times, online: <www.ft.com/content/7c6555fa-7c46-11e6-b837-eb4b4333ee43> 
[“Migration Spat Mars Leaders’ Bid to Revive EU”]; James Traub, “Europe Wishes to 
Inform You That the Refugee Crisis Is Over” (18 October 2016) Foreign Policy, online: 
<www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/18/europe-wishes-to-inform-you-that-the-refugee-crisis-
is-over/>. Traub states: “From the point of view of Europe’s political leaders, who must be 
attentive to increasingly frightened publics, the refugee crisis was above all a crisis of borders 
and thus of state sovereignty. It was the refugees, that is, who posed the crisis” (ibid).
56. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 
(entered into force 22 April 1954 [Convention]. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a 
refugee as a person with a “fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country” (ibid art 1). Also see United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 268, 19 UST 622-24. See generally James C Hathaway, “Can 
International Refugee Law be Made Relevant Again?” in James C Hathaway, ed, Reconceiving 
International Refugee Law (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1997) xvii.
57. The right of non-refoulement prohibits nations from returning refugees to situations 
where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. See James C Hathaway & 
R Alexander Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 115 at 160 
(describing non-refoulement and calling it “[t]he most critical of all refugee rights”).
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improved the lives of millions of people. But those rules have shortcomings. 
They are hard to enforce and their scope is limited: their obligations apply only 
to states that refugees are able to reach, which helps explain why so many states 
take extraordinary measures to ensure that refugees do not reach them.
States have many reasons to turn away refugees, some of them—as brutally 
illustrated by many states’ resistance to taking in Syrian refugees—rooted in 
cultural or religious differences that some would resist calling ‘costs.’58 But it is 
undeniable that accepting refugees can be costly by any definition of the term. 
States can be legally, or at least morally, obligated to provide basics like food 
and shelter. They might have to integrate refugees into public life in ways that 
can, as we have unfortunately seen, be quite costly to national politics. What is 
particularly troubling is that these costs are not evenly distributed. They are often 
concentrated on the states least able to bear them—those near the countries the 
refugees are fleeing.
We are not the first writers to notice these problems nor to suggest solutions 
using market mechanisms. One category of solution employs what is often called 
‘burden-sharing’ among host nations. These kinds of plans have been described in 
detail by many scholars, the classic treatment being that by James Hathaway and 
Alex Neve.59 Such plans typically involve tradeable quotas for refugees, regional 
planning, and payments from rich nations to poor nations to handle things like 
processing of refugees. A second category of market-based solutions advocates 
that countries of origin pay compensation to the refugees they create.60
Neither category of proposal has seen much success. European nations were 
talking about burden-sharing when Hathaway, Neve, Peter Schuck and others 
wrote their proposals decades ago;61 those conversations continue today and face 
58. See e.g. Ishaan Tharoor, “The So-Called ‘Islamic Rape of Europe’ is Part of a Long and Racist 
History,” Washington Post (18 February 2016), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2016/02/18/the-so-called-islamic-rape-of-europe-is-part-of-a-long-and-racist-
history/?utm_term=.d98f44e8e759>.
59. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 57; Peter H Schuck, “Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest 
Proposal” (1997) 22:2 Yale J Intl L 243.
60. See e.g. Luke T Lee, “The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum” 
(1986) 80:3 AJIL 532.
61. See Karoline Kerber, “Temporary Protection: An Assessment of the Harmonisation Policties 
of European Union Member States” (1997) 9:3 Int’l Refguee L 453.
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the same difficulties.62 Compensation remains a dream for most refugees, in part 
because it is practically (and perhaps legally) impossible for them to claim it.
B. A MARKET-BASED SOLUTION
Building on these prior efforts, our goal is to describe a market-based solution—
admittedly a partial one—to the refugee crisis.63 Our hope is to decrease the 
costs to host states, increase the costs to oppressive countries of origin, and give 
refugees an asset with which to shape their own futures.
Our starting proposition is that a state violates international law when it 
generates refugees through persecution. There are a great many sources of 
international law—both treaties and custom—to support this proposition.64 As is 
always the case with international human rights-type claims, national sovereignty 
presents something of an obstacle. But sovereignty is on both sides of the scale 
here: When a country creates refugees, it forces them into other countries whose 
sovereignty is thereby violated.
Our second proposition is that international law recognizes the legitimacy of 
claims to compensation against countries of origin, both by refugees and by host 
states. Again, the countries of origin would have a sovereignty-based defence, this 
one arising from sovereign immunity. But we do not think it would necessarily 
be an insurmountable obstacle, for at least two reasons. First, in the post-World 
War II era, sovereign immunity has eroded in the context of international 
human rights claims. Second, the notion of waiver has expanded significantly 
in the commercial context. Our proposal would capitalize on both of those 
developments and suggest that they be pushed further.
One of the central challenges—as with any remedial scheme in any legal 
context—are figuring out how to calculate the ‘damages,’ who should get them, 
and how they should be collected. We believe that damages could be calculated 
62. See e.g. “Migration Spat Mars Leaders’ Bid to Revive EU,” supra note 55; Martin Sandbu, 
“Free Lunch: Horsetrading and Peacemaking,” Financial Times (9 May 2016), online: 
<www.ft.com/content/61d1be6c-1388-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173>; Nils Muiznieks, 
“You’re Better Than This, Europe,” New York Times (28 June 2015), online: <www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/youre-better-than-this-europe.html >; James Hathaway, 
“Moving Beyond the Asylum Muddle” (14 September 2015) Blog of the European Journal 
of International Law, online: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/moving-beyond-the-asylum-
muddle/>. Hathaway states, “Despite the fact that consensus on a comprehensive means to 
operationalize the [burden-sharing] treaty was reached, no action was taken by either the 
UNHCR or governments to move the project forward on the international stage” (ibid).
63. See also Blocher & Gulati, “Competing for Refugees,” supra note 7.
64. See e.g. Lee, supra note 60 at 536-40.
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with an eye towards compensation for refugees, incentives for potential host 
states, and punishment for oppressive states of origin. As an initial matter, 
we think that the claims should be owed to groups, rather than to individual 
refugees. Persecution tends to be a group-based phenomenon, so we begin with 
a group-based remedy.
The key to the compensation element of our system—and what differentiates 
us from scholars like Luke Lee who have made related compensation proposals65—
is that we would make the claim to compensation tradeable to host states. Refugee 
groups would have an asset that they could use to overcome the problems of 
national incentives described in Part II(A), above.
The host states—the ones who accept the refugees—could then take the 
claim and enforce it against the country of origin. They would, for obvious 
reasons, be much better positioned than the refugees to collect. If the host states 
had existing sovereign debts with the countries of origin, they could use the claim 
as an offset. Or perhaps they could transfer it to one of the so-called “vulture” 
funds that specialize in, and have become extremely good at, pursuing sovereign 
debt.66 Those funds are not always attractive characters, but this would give them 
a chance to play hero.
We are not so bold as to think that our idea will necessarily be adopted more 
easily than those that came before. Nor do we suppose that our idea is without 
serious potential flaws. A detailed analysis of the problems is beyond the scope 
of this article, but the one most relevant to the subject of this special issue—
and on which we were pressed the hardest at the symposium—is the issue of 
commodification. We take this objection seriously. By putting a financial figure 
on refugee groups, perhaps we are contributing to the view of them as economic 
burdens rather than people. Perhaps thinking about a humanitarian crisis in 
monetary terms is simply a category mistake and makes a solution impossible.
We do not think that to be the case. The root of the problem we identified at 
the outset is that refugees are already commodified. Potential host states already 
consider the ‘costs’ and ‘burdens’ of admitting refugees, and turn them away 
as a result.67 Only recently, Turkey blatantly traded away the rights of refugees 
seeking passage to the European Union in exchange for travel benefits for its own 
65. See Lee, supra note 60.
66. For a discussion, see Stephen J Choi, G Mitu Gulati & Robert E Scott, 
“Contractual Arbitrage” (13 June 2016), online: <www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2794794>.
67. See e.g. the discusson of the European Commission proposal that countries refusing to take 
in refugees be fined Euro 250,000 per refugee refused in Sandbu, supra note 62.
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citizens.68 In that sense, the human rights crisis is a debt crisis. Our hope is to 
give those refugees an asset—one paid for by the country that persecuted them—
and, in doing so, to give other states a better reason to admit them. Moreover, 
we would make refugees not the objects of the market, but participants in it; they 
would get to decide what happens with their asset.
III. MISBEHAVING REGIONS OR MEMBER STATES
So far we have focused our attention on scenarios in which the state is the bad 
actor, and we have tried to design remedies for the regions or refugee groups that 
have been wronged. But what about the reverse scenario, in which a state wishes 
to expel a region or an international union wishes to expel a member state? What 
if—it should not be too hard to imagine—a member state in an international 
monetary union arguably fails to respect its obligations (think of Greece and the 
Eurozone). What if a region of a country becomes radicalized to the degree that 
it refuses to follow even the most basic legal rules in the country’s constitution? 
Or what if a state decides that it would like to ‘liberate’ one of its former colonies, 
perhaps against the wishes of that region’s residents?
A common assumption is that expulsion is simply not an option. The 
reasons for this are clear enough. International obligations, whether in the form 
of treaties or customary international law, cannot be disregarded at will. Were it 
otherwise, the system as a whole might collapse.
And yet international law and practice do not seem to contain explicit or 
well-established rules against such transfers. Cession is one of the primary legal 
mechanisms by which states can and do acquire territory, and it does not (at least 
in the traditional understanding) require anything like a plebiscite in the region 
being transferred.
Moreover, it is not obvious why an absolute rule against expulsion should 
prevail. Instead of Greece and the Eurozone, imagine that Turkey were a member 
of the European Union. Could the members really not expel Turkey if its 
government (with overwhelming popular support) decided that it wanted to 
deny women the right to education or abolish a free press? If, in keeping with the 
responsibility to protect mentioned in Part I(C), above, an international body can 
send troops into a country to prevent genocide, why could it not also formally 
dissociate itself from  a country that systematically disadvantages—oppresses, 
68. See Mark Yarnell, “Refugees Become Trading Chips in EU-Turkey Negotiations,” 
(16 March 2016) Refugees International, online: <www.refugeesinternational.org/
blog/2016/3/16/turkey>.
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really—a large segment of its population? If a region can leave an oppressive or 
unrepresentative country, why should a country (or group of countries) not be 
able to do the same to a region that is misbehaving in an equivalent fashion?
These questions have not typically been asked of international law, because 
the paradigmatic cases throughout history have involved states acquiring territory, 
or supranational organizations growing their membership. Because states and 
supranational organizations are subject to very different rules and principles, 
scholars tend to address them separately;69 we focus on the former in this article. 
For states, the drive to expand was, of course, a function of the fact that territory 
has long been considered valuable—so much so that the desire to expand has 
often been considered an inevitable characteristic of modern states.70 There are 
good reasons to think that this is no longer the case, and that we have reached a 
point in history when control over sovereign territory is no longer the unalloyed 
good it once seemed—many states and international unions are better served to 
shrink. Borders are being pushed apart, not just pulled.
The importance of this development is difficult to overstate, and it requires a 
re-thinking of some rules of international law. Existing rules and prohibitions are 
primarily designed to avoid things like violent conquest and colonial domination; 
they are not necessarily well-suited to prevent other forms of harm. On the 
traditional understanding of international law, an involuntary acquisition would 
be forbidden; an involuntary cession would not be. Perhaps there is something to 
this asymmetry, but at the least it requires justification.
While we think involuntary expulsion should perhaps be an option in some 
cases, we do not think that states should be able to jettison territory at will. The 
bar must be high, just as it is for other border-altering scenarios like remedial 
secession. In fact, we think that analogous rules should apply in both scenarios. 
Whereas in Part II, we focused on situations in which a state treats a region 
69. See Blocher & Gulati, “Forced Secessions,” supra note 8 (addressing expulsion from 
nations); Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note 8 (addressing expulsion from international 
organizations).
70. See Andrew F Burghardt, “The Bases of Territorial Claims” (1973) 63:2 Geographical Rev 
225. Burghardt states, “Virtually all states and empires have treated territory as being of itself 
good … .” (ibid at 225). Quoting Machiavelli, Burghardt states, “[T]he wish to acquire more 
[territory] is admittedly a very natural and common thing; and when men succeed in this 
they are always praised rather than condemned” (ibid at 225). See also Bernard H Oxman, 
“The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea” (2006) 100:4 AJIL 830. Oxman asserts, 
“The history of international law since the Peace of Westphalia is in significant measure an 
account of the territorial temptation” (ibid at 830).
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poorly, our interest here is in what happens when a state is being harmed by one 
of its regions in an analogous—which is to say, quite serious—fashion.
By stipulation, a region does not govern a state.71 But regions can nonetheless 
impose serious costs on the states of which they are a part, and not all of these 
costs are the kinds of things a state should prima facie have to accept. In Coasean 
terms, we are envisioning the ‘costs’ of bad government as reciprocal between the 
region and the state—the resolution of any dispute will involve imposing costs 
on one or the other party. Seeing the relationship in this way leads to a three-part 
framework analogous to that in Table 2. This framework for involuntary expulsion 
of a region is set out in Table 3.
First, well-behaved regions may not be expelled, for precisely the same reason 
that well-governed states do not have to let their regions leave. As explained in 
more detail in Part I(C), above, there is a strong (if perhaps not yet official) 
principle in international law supporting remedial secession for regions and 
groups that face serious persecution. There is not necessarily any reason why a 
country could not invoke the same principle against one of its own regions—in 
fact, it would just mean that the population remedially seceding was a majority, 
rather than a minority.
Second, regions that blatantly disregard their legal, political, and moral 
obligations should be liable to expulsion in precisely the same way—and for 
precisely the same reason—that a region may freely secede from an oppressive 
or genocidal country. The level of misbehaviour necessary to trigger this right of 
expulsion would be high—the equivalent of the persecution and oppression that 
would give rise to a right of remedial secession.
Finally, we suggest the creation of a middle category in which the region’s 
misbehaviour does not rise to the level of oppression or persecution. In this 
category, a region that is significantly underperforming or falling short on 
its obligations, but not committing violations on the level of persecution or 
oppression, can be expelled—but not for free. As with the paid-secession examples 
in Part I(C), above, compensation will be owed.
71. There are situations, of course, in which a regional or minority group will command power at 
the national level. Where that is the case, the rules we describe in Part I would apply.
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TABLE 3: ELEMENTS OF THE EXPULSION FRAMEWORK
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Who ‘Owns’ 
Sovereignty Parent state Parent state Region
Who Must Approve Parent state and Region Parent state Parent state
Who Sets Price Parent state and Region Parent state
1. Auction; 2 ICJ 
(if price disputed)
Corresponding Legal 
Principle Territorial Sovereignty
Self-Determination 
(or Remedial 
Secession)
Combination 
of Territorial 
Sovereignty and 
Self-Determination
State of Governance 
in Region
Good (Strong Default 
Rule)
Oppressive or 
Genocidal
Denies 
Representation or 
Equal Rights
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT MARKETS TELL US ABOUT 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND VICE VERSA
In this article, we have explored the relationship between markets and governance, 
finding that each shows us something important about the other.
As to markets, there are scenarios in which, bounded by proper rules, 
a market-style approach can help solve serious problems of sovereign control. 
We are not insensitive to the many potential problems with markets and address 
them in detail elsewhere,72 but as a general matter, we do not think that they are 
intractable enough to write off the idea entirely.
In addition, these market-style reforms are largely consistent with existing 
international law—at least as viewed through a progressive lens. Existing law 
can, for example, accommodate both burden-sharing among nations with regard 
to refugees, and the payment of compensation to refugees. We have admittedly 
suggested some alterations to the framework, such as a requirement of regional 
approval for cessions in well-governed countries, a mechanism for paid secession 
in countries that deny representation and equal rights, and a system of tradeable 
claims for refugees.
72. See Blocher & Gulati, “A Market for Sovereign Control,” supra note 6 at Part III (addressing 
risks of war, colonialism, anti-democracy, and impossibility).
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But these changes are not written on a blank slate. We think that support for 
them can be found within international law. The principles of self-determination 
and remedial secession, the responsibility to protect, and the nascent norm of 
fiduciary duty all point in the direction of a world in which territorial sovereignty 
must be made to accommodate, or at least exist alongside, a variety of other 
important legal principles.
In addition to what our proposals indicate about markets, there are lessons 
to be learned for sovereignty itself. First, sovereignty is alienable. There is nothing 
radical in making this assertion. Sovereign control has been ceded, traded, gifted, 
leased, and otherwise transferred between states for generations and is the subject 
of well-established international law rules. What we have tried to do is emphasize 
ways in which people can have direct control over such transfers—not simply by 
moving across borders (after all, every migrant and refugee has, at least for him- 
or-herself, effected a change in sovereign control), but by moving the borders 
themselves. As for countries, we have emphasized ways in which sovereignty 
should sometimes be involuntarily alienable: When states or regions violate 
their basic legal, moral, and political obligations, they thereby lose the benefit 
of sovereignty.
Second, and to return to the Radin passage with which we began, sovereignty 
can be thought of as market alienable. There is a long history of ‘sovereignty sales,’ 
from compensated cessions of territory, to long-term leases, to the economic 
considerations that shape contemporary immigration and refugee policy. This 
may not mollify critics who oppose our proposals on commodification grounds, 
but it should remind them that the ship has already left port.
Third, we have described a market-based framework in which people, not 
states, are the primary ‘owners’ of sovereignty. The traditional conception of 
sovereignty gives states control over sovereignty, but there is nothing essential 
about that idea.
Traditional attacks on sovereignty—exemplified by the battles to establish 
a robust and enforceable system of international human rights law—have tried 
to minimize and overcome sovereignty. Our approach is different. We do not 
seek to destroy sovereignty, but to take it and put it in the hands of the people 
themselves. What we have described is not just a market for sovereign control, 
but popular sovereignty on a global scale.
